"Polytheism and The Trinity"

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a metaphysics developed to counter the charge of polytheism. Three individuals – one takes them to be individuals – are mentioned in certain New Testament passages, such as “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 28:19); and “The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all” (2 Corinthians 13:13).

If the “Father” and the “Son” and the “Holy Spirit” are each God, then it appears each is a separate God – i.e. polytheism. The doctrine of the Trinity holds that such an appearance is misleading.

Perhaps the first Trinitarian metaphysics is developed by Tertullian in the early third century. “These three are one substance, not one person.” In the fourth century Nicene Creed, Jesus is said to be “the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all worlds, … begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father.” The doctrine of the Trinity is illustrated in the late medieval “Shield of the Trinity”:

Although the Trinity is sometimes said to be a “mystery,” it is actually understandable – odd, perhaps, but understandable.

There is one God, but it – and I deliberately use the impersonal pronoun – is the substance which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share, and which is presumably shared by no other being. To avoid polytheism, the term “God” must refer not to an individual but to the substance underlying the three persons of the Trinity, which we can call “God-stuff”.

“God,” taken as referring to God-stuff, turns out to be a mass noun, like “clay” or “water”. The claim that there is but one God is on a (metaphysical) par with such odd-sounding claims as: there is but one clay, there is but one water, etc.

The doctrine of the Trinity befuddles because it flouts our ordinary ways of counting (individuating). Suppose I have a lump of clay – assume it to be all the clay there is – and make three minimal sculptures from it, a sphere, a cube, and a pyramid, and place them on a table. How many things are on the table? The natural answer is three. Someone who gave the answer “one” – as in one clay – would have some explaining to do.

Of course, someone might think that substance is more fundamental (because more permanent) than things; that clay is more fundamental than the objects into which it is temporarily formed. And thinking this, a person might have grounds for answering “one” to the preceding question, How many things are on the table?

But you have to be consistent about this. You can’t consistently answer “three” to the question of how many things are on the table, and “one” to the question of how many Gods are in heaven. Or if you do, you might reasonably be accused of doing so merely to avoid the charge of polytheism.

[Note: Mormonism is sometimes accused of being a polytheism. There are several reasons for this, but one is the claim of “deification” – that men may aspire to participate in the divine nature. If “God” is God-stuff, then – why not? – beings other than the three permanent members of the Trinity can become “of one substance” with them. This blocks the charge of polytheism, but in turn requires some further doctrine of transubstantiation.]

By: Bob Yanal, a Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Wayne State University, Detroit.